In this paper we investigate the sources of instability in credit and nancial systems and the eect of credit linkages on the macroeconomic activity. By developing an agentbased model, we analyze the evolving dynamics of the economy as a complex, adaptive and interactive system, which allows us to explain some key elements occurred during the recent economic and nancial crisis. In particular, we study the repercussions of inter-bank connectivity on agents' performances, bankruptcy waves and business cycle uctuations. Interbank linkages, in fact, let participants share risk but also creates a potential for one bank's crisis to spread through the network. The purpose of the model is, therefore, to build up the dependence among agents at the micro-level and to estimate their impact on the macro stability.
loans, due to the capital adequacy ratios, rms net worth inuences the banks willingness to lend money to highly leveraged rms. The seminal papers by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) showed that informational asymmetries in the credit markets may prevent rms to obtain credit, even those with good investment projects. Further research highlighted the so-called nancial accelerator mechanism, i.e. a balance sheet channel through which monetary policy has real eects in the economy (Bernanke and Gertler, 1990; Greenwald and Stiglitz, 1993; Bernanke and Gertler,1995) .
Following the agent-based modeling, in this paper we are explicitly concerned with the potential of the inter-bank market to act as a contagion mechanism for liquidity crises and to determine the eect of the banks connectivity on macroeconomic outcomes such business cycle uctuations and bankruptcies. This approach, which explicitly models the agents' interaction at the micro level, is thus able to emphasize the role of the investment-nance link not just as a propagator of shocks but as the main source of nancial instability and business cycle uctuations.
This work is based on an existing agent-based model (Delli Gatti et al, 2005) which, simulating the behavior of interacting heterogeneous rms and one bank, is able to generate a large number of stylized facts, but does not consider a system of multiple interactive banks. Here, instead, we introduce multiple banks which can operate not only in the credit market but also in the inter-bank system 3 . In our model, rms may ask for loans from banks to increase their production rate and prot. If contacted banks face liquidity shortage when trying to cover the rms' requirements, they may borrow from a surplus bank in the inter-bank system 4 . In this market, therefore, lender banks share with borrowers bank the risk for the loan to the rm. We model credit and inter-bank systems as random graphs (see Allen and Gale 2000, for instance), and we study the network resilience by changing the degree of connectivity among agents. In our model, bankruptcies are determined as nancially fragile rms fail, that is their net worth becomes negative. If one or more rms are not able to pay back their debts to the bank, the bank's balance sheet decreases and, consequently, the rms' bad debt, aecting the 3 To our knowledge, until now, several agent-based models have been developed with regard to single sectors of the economy (production, labor, credit, etc.) , while the development of models of a multiple-market economy as a whole is still at the dawn (see for example Cincotti et al. 2010; Riccetti et al. 2011 and among the few attempts. Instead, the multiple nature of the links (nancial and commercial) and the existence of direct links among all the dierent actors (bank-bank, bank-rms and rm-rm) would be extremely useful for understanding the propagation of systemic risk and joint failures, both among similar and dierent economic actors. 4 There are great variations between banks in the use they make of interbank market. In any case, this market should make funds available quickly and eciently to banks which have lending opportunities and should enable the banking system to adapt much more speedily and smoothly to new demands than would otherwise be possible. Interbank market is, thus, the natural channel in order to avoid the liquidity diculties which might otherwise exist among nancial institutions (see BIS 1983).
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UNIVERSITÀ POLITECNICA DELLE MARCHE Ruggero Grilli, Gabriele Tedeschi and Mauro Gallegati: Markets connectivity and nancial contagion equity of banks, can also lead to bank failures. As banks, in case of shortage of liquidity, may enter the interbank market, the failure of borrower banks could lead to failures of lender banks. Agents' bad debt, thus, can bring about a cascade of bankruptcies among banks. The source of the domino eect may be due to indirect interaction between bankrupt rms and their lending banks through the credit market , on one side, and to direct interaction between lender and borrower banks through the inter-bank system, on the other side. Our ndings suggest that there are issues with the role that the bank system plays in the real economy and in pursuing economic growth. Indeed, our model shows that a heavilyinterconnected inter-bank system increases nancial fragility, leading to economic crises and distress contagion.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the model with the behavior of rms and banks and the trading mechanism on credit and inter-bank system. In Section 3, we present the results of the simulations for dierent inter-bank linkages on contagion phase and on the business cycle uctuations. Finally, Section 4 concludes.
The model
In our simulated economy three markets coexist: the goods market, the credit market and the inter-bank market. The system is populated by a constant number of rms and banks, who undertake decisions at discrete time t = 1, 2, ..., T . Given the structure of the model, we are able not only to analyze the interaction among agents, but also to study their behaviors in dierent markets.
The goods market is implemented following the model of Delli Gatti et al. (2005) where output is supply-determined, that is rms sell all the output they optimally decide to produce. Because rms use a linear technology with capital as the only input, output follows the evolution of the capital stock, which in turn is determined by investment. Finally, investment depends on the interest rate and the rm's nancial fragility, which is inversely related to the equity.
Each period a subset of rms enter in the credit market asking for credit. The amount of credit requested by companies is related to their investment expenditure, which is, therefore, dependent on interest rate and rm's economic situation.
The primary purpose of banks is to channel their funds towards loans to companies. Consulted banks, analyzed their own credit risk and the rm's risk, may grant the requested loan, 4/22 when they have enough supply of liquidity. The supply of credit is a percentage of banks' equity because nancial institutions adopt a system of risk management based upon an equity ratio. When consulted banks do not have liquidity to lend, they can enter in the interbank system, in order not to lose the opportunity of earning on investing rms 5 .
Firms behavior
We have a large nite population of competitive rms indexed by i = 1, ..., N . Firms are prot seekers, therefore, at any time period t, they try to maximize their expected prots. As in the Stiglitz framework (1990, 1993) , in our model rms sell all the output they (optimally) decide to produce at an individual selling price, P i,t . This is assumed to be a random variable with expected value P t , i.e., the market price, and nite variance. As a consequence, the relative price,
Pt , is a random variable with expected value E(u i,t ) = 1 and nite variance. To produce a homogeneous output Y i,t , the rm i uses capital K i,t as the only input. The rm's production function is
with the capital productivity φ constant and uniform across rms.
In order to increase the production, the rm i can nance itself via internal sources, networth A i,t , or recur to bank loan 6 L i,t . As a result, rms capital stock motion evolves according to
With this respect, companies can endogenously choose their funding strategies among two main classes -self-nancing and external nancing-and, over time, change their strategies of nancing (see Vitali et al. 2011) . At each time t, the debt commitmentsL i,t (interest & installment) for the rm i are
t is the real interest rate that rm i pays to bank j. We assume that a loan given at time t to the rm i has to be payed back by the next τ periods. For simplicity, we furthermore assume that each rm has total variable costs equal to nancing costs. Therefore, prots in real term are 5 The role played by banks in our simulated inter-bank market is related to their customers business. In fact, nancial institutions use this market in order not to lose the protability coming from the loan activity to their customers. However, in the analysis of interbank markets, it is dicult to discriminate between roles played by dierent banks. In practice, it is not easy to distinguish interbank activity that is pure trading from that which is related to customer business (see Myers and Majluf 1984; BIS 1983) . 6 We are assuming that the rm i is rationed on the equity market and has to rely on the bank to obtain external nance.
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Because of the uncertain environment, rm i may go bankrupt and bankruptcy occurs if the net worth at time t becomes negative A i,t < 0. The bankrupt rm leaves the market. The enterprise's exit process is, therefore, reconnected to the nancial fragility: a company leaves the system if its net-worth is so low that an adverse shock makes it become negative, or if it suers a loss so huge as to deplete all the net worth accumulated in the past (see Greenwald & Stiglitz 1993) . The problem of the rm i consists in maximizing the expected prots E(π i,t ) minus bankruptcy costs. As discussed by Greenwald & Stiglitz (1990) , bankruptcy costs are due to legal, administrative and reputational costs incurred during the bankruptcy procedure. These costs are expected to raise with the rm's size 7 . We can formulate the problem of each rm i as: (5) which is decreasing in both real interest rate and leverage, and increasing with nancial soundness, proxied by the rm's net worth. To achieve the optimal capital stock, the rm i can recur to its own net worth (internal funds) and, if needed, to new mortgaged debt (external funds). So, the demand of credit 9 is
7 In the formulation proposed by Delli Gatti et al. (2005), for instance, bankruptcy costs are increasing and quadratic in the level of output. 8 The leverage, li,t, reects the rm's nancial fragility based on debt commitments Gi,t and net-worth ratio,
. 9 The demand of credit -or asked loan-L d i,t may be dierent from the granted loan Li,tdue to the trading mechanism on the credit and inter-bank market explained in section (2.3).
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Banks behavior
Similar to rms, we have a constant population of competitive banks indexed by j = 1, ..., B. Each bank has a balance sheet structure dened as S j,t = E j,t + D j,t , with S j,t being the credit supply, E j,t the equity base and D j,t deposits which, in this framework, are determined as a residual. The regulation of nancial intermediaries (Basel I-III) forces banks to hold a capital cushion of α% of equity to prevent bankruptcies due to unexpected losses. For the sake of simplicity, we model this regulatory parameter assuming that banks have a credit supply which is a percentage of their equity:
This means that the credit supply for a nancial institution is proportional to its equity (the smaller the banks the smaller their transactions). α is the fraction of external risk a bank is allowed to take within a given time-step, with respect to its own equity. Since total equity is an insucient measure of risk, at least in the light of the global nancial crisis which has clearly shown the inadequacy of our available tools to respond to the nancial instability (see Sornette et al. 2011 ), we introduce a more risk-sensitive framework for banks' risk activities. In particular, we model a bank's risk aversion coecient, such that the nancial institution j gives the requested loan to the borrower i with a certain probability 10 :
whereḠ i,t is the amount of existing debt for borrower i and χ ∈ [0, 1] has to be interpreted as the bank's risk aversion coecient -the higher χ, the higher the bank risk aversion. This threshold may be viewed as a risk aversion parameter, since it imposes an upper limit for a bank's risk dependent on its liquidity. It is a helpful tool to limit the bank's risk, in particular the credit risk. Moreover, according to Eq. (7), the volume of credit given by bank j is proportional to the nancial fragility of its borrower i, that is an over-leveraged borrower has higher probability to be rationed than a solid one.
The primary function of banks activity is to lend their funds through loans to rms, as this is their way to make money via interest rates. The bank j oers its interest rate to the borrower i:
with δ j being a bank specic iid random variable, l i,t the borrower i's leverage (see footnote 8) and 0 < θ < 1. So the interest rate is decreasing with the borrower's nancial robustness. In a sense, we adopt the principle according to which the interest rate charged by banks incorporates an external nance premium increasing with the leverage and, therefore, inversely related to the borrower's net worth 11 .
2.3 The trading mechanism on the credit and inter-bank network
When the rm i needs loan, L d i,t > 0, it contacts a number of randomly chosen banks with an iid probability x. Credit linkages between rms and banks are dened by a connectivity matrix,
is either one or zero; a value of one indicates that a credit linkage may exist between rm i and bank j and zero indicates no relationship. ∆ i,j t are randomly chosen at the beginning of each time step t. x represents the probability that ∆ i,j t is one for any two agents. At one extreme, x= 0 represents the case of no credit lending, while x=1 represents a situation in which all rms can potentially borrow from each bank (see Erdos and Renyi 1959) . Contacted banks, checked the investment risk (Eq. 7) and their amount of liquidity (i.e S j,t ≥ L d i,t ), oer an interest rate (Eq 8). After exploring the lending conditions of the contacted banks, each rm asks the consulted banks for credit starting with the one oering the lowest interest rate. Banks deal with rms in a "rst come, rst served" basis.
If in the credit market, the contacted nancial institutions have not enough supply of liquidity to fully satisfy the rm's loan (i.e S j,t < L d i,t ), then banks consider to use the inter-bank market 12 . As in the credit market, the requiring bank (borrower j b ) asks the lacking fraction of the loan requested by the rm from a number of randomly chosen banks (lenders k l ) with an iid probability ρ. Among the contacted banks, the banks satisfying the risk threshold in Eq. 7 and having enough supply of liquidity oer the loan to the asking bank for an interbank interest rate 13 , which equals the credit market interest rate in Eq. (8). Among this subset of oering banks, the borrower j b chooses the lender k l , starting with the one oering the lowest interest rate. When it receives the requested loan, the bank lend it to the asking rm. 14 11 In our model the bank behaves as a lender in a Bernanke-Gertler (1989 world characterized by asymmetric information and costly state verication. See Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) for a comprehensive exposition of the approach. 12 The need for an inter-bank market is related to the need for banks to adjust the volume of their assets and liabilities. In particular, large emphasis has been given to the deposits withdrawal (see, for instance, Diamond and Dybvig, 1983 and Iori et al. 2006 ). In our framework, the reasons for using this market arise from the banks need to adjust their assets in order to exploit lending opportunities. In our model, in fact, liabilities side, and in particular deposits, is determined as a residual. In a forthcoming paper, we extend the analysis allowing an endogenous deposits motion. 13 The interbank interest rate r
is a function of the borrower bank's leverage lj b ,t. 14 The advantage of our trading mechanism respect to a supply demand in-balance approach is that exchanges are determined through the trading mechanism itself without ad-hoc rules for reaching an equilibrium. The
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The bank's prot depends on interests on credit market (rst term), on interests on inter-bank market (second term), which can be either positive or negative depending on bank j net position (lender or borrower), on interests payed on deposits and equity (third term). 16 Bank net worth evolves according to:
with the last two terms on the right side being rms and banks' bad debts respectively 17 . Similar to rms, nancial institutions go bankrupt when their equity at time t becomes negative E j,t < 0. The failed bank leaves the market.
When rms and banks fail, they are replaced by new entrants, which are on average smaller than incumbents. So, entrants' size is drawn from a uniform distribution centered around the mode of the size distribution of incumbent rms/banks (see Bartelsman et al. 2005) .
Simulations and results
The model is studied numerically for dierent values of the parameter ρ, which drives the inter-bank connectivity. We consider an economy consisting of N = 1000 rms and B = 50 banks and study it over a time span of T = 1000 periods. Each rm 18 is initially given the same amount of capital supply demand in-balance approach shortcuts the study of the out-of-the-equilibrium dynamics by jumping to the stationary points. The trading mechanism we implement here, instead, enables us to understand how the economy behaves out of equilibrium. In particular, given the constraints on agent's risk-aversion and the excess individual demand, we are able to model rationing on both markets. 15 In inter-bank markets maturities are short, normally between overnight and one years, although placements longer can be arranged (see BIS 1983; Anito 2011; Dingen and Von Hagen 2007) . Interestingly, the empirical analysis generally shows that long-term interbank exposures result in lower risk for borrowing banks (see Dingen and Von Hagen 2007) . Following this view, in this paper, we model longer maturities. 16r j,t is the average interest rate that bank j obtains in the credit market. 17 i ∈ Ωt and k ∈ Ξt are the subset of rms and banks unable to pay their debts back because they go bankrupt. 18 The initial value of rms' equity and loan is consistent with empirical studies on newcomers. Researches show a general tendency for new companies to nance themselves with equity rather than loan. The initial bank funding to new rms is around 16% (see Berger and Udell 1998; Cassar, G. 2004 ).
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UNIVERSITÀ POLITECNICA DELLE MARCHE Ruggero Grilli, Gabriele Tedeschi and Mauro Gallegati: Markets connectivity and nancial contagion K i,0 = 100, net-worth A i,0 = 65 and loan L i,0 = 35. We x 19 τ = 4, φ = 0.8, c = 1, λ = 0.3, α = 0.1, χ = 0.8, ψ = 0.1 and θ = 0.05. The probability of attachment between rms and banks in the credit market is x = 0.05. In this way the number of rm's out-going links is less than three. The reason being that in a highly connected random network synchronisation could be achieved via indirect links. The eects of direct contagion among nancial institutions are easier to be tested in a network where indirect synchronisation is less likely to arise. We repeat simulations 100 times with dierent random seeds.
We start by analyzing the eect of inter-bank linkages on the systemic risk. Then we analyze the correlation between the nancial and the real sector of the economy.
Banks behavior and systemic risk
The question we address here is whether phenomena of collective bankruptcies are related to connectivity. In order to answer it, we study the eects of inter-bank linkages on contagion phase in the nancial market. In particular, we focus on one of the most extreme examples of systemic failure, namely bank bankruptcies. The left panel of Fig.1 shows the average number of failed banks, over all times and all simulations as a function of the degree of connectivity of the inter-bank network. The gure shows that modeling the inter-bank system as a random graph, when increasing the degree of connectivity of the network, the probability of bankruptcy avalanches increases. However, this relationship is non-monotonically related with the level of ρ, i.e bankruptcies decrease with the level of the connectivity up to a threshold, which can be dubbed as pseudo-optimal, and then increase 20 . Rising the connectivity, the network is less exposed to systemic risk, at the beginning, thanks to risk sharing. However, when the connectivity becomes too high, the systematic risk eventually increases (see Castiglionesi and Navarro 2007; Wagner 2010; Battiston et al. 2012a-b , for empirical evidences and theoretical analysis.).
We now turn to the issue of contagious failures. Collective bankruptcies arise from the complex nature of agents interaction (see Rochet and Tirole 1996; Angelini 1996; Thurner et al 2003; Lenzu and Tedeschi 2012) . As emphasized in Iori and Jafarey (2001) , the history of modern 19 The robustness of our qualitative results has been checked by recurring to Monte Carlo techniques. We have run 100 independent simulations for dierent values of the initial seed generating the pseudo-random numbers. This exercise has been repeated by changing the parameter χ, which reects the bank's risk aversion coecient, starting from 0.1 to 0.7 with steps of 0.3 and τ = 4, which mirrors the repayment timing, starting from 1 to 6 with steps of 1. We have then studied the moments of the distributions of the statistics of interest. Results conrm that our ndings are quite robust. 20 In particular, when ρ = 0 the average number of banks bankruptcies is equal banking is full of examples of systemic failures at both moderate and large scales. This result is analyzed in Fig. 1 (center) , which shows the number of surviving banks 21 for dierent values of ρ.
As expected, a more inter-connected interbank market results in larger cascades of bankruptcies due to the larger systemic risk. In fact, when increasing the connectivity, instead of a relatively uniform decline in the number of banks over time, there is subsequent sharp decline in the time paths of surviving banks. To better analyze this result, the right panel of Fig 1 displays the average slope of the number of surviving banks curve as a function of ρ. This graph provides the evidence of contagious failures, that is periods in which many banks collapse together. Indeed, a too high level of connectivity corresponds to higher banks nancial fragility 22 , as shown by the left panel of gure (2). In line with Minsky's view (1986) , the default of a bank is essentially due to an excessive amassment of debts which, in our model, increases with the linkages. So a too high connectivity generates a higher systemic risk, not oset by a lower sharing risk (see Cirillo et al 2012 for additional evidence). Moreover, in line with many empirical studies (see Humphrey, 1986; Angelini et al., 1996; Furne, 2003; Upper and Worms 2002 ) gure 2 (central and right panel) shows that the degree of contagion depends on the size of losses imposed by failing debtors on creditors in the system. The distribution of failed agents for dierent interbank linkages is skewed and grows faster for high levels of connectivity. 21 Since the purpose of central and right panels of g. 1 is to analyze the dynamic of a self-contained system with a given initial number of banks, we exclude the possibility that failing banks would be replaced by new entrants.
22 Average banks nancial fragility is equal to 0.56 (s.d 0.045) for ρ = 0 and decreases to 0.50 (sd 0.03) for ρ = 0.2. The dierence in the means is supported by a two-sided Welch t-test (t=350,82). 
Contagion eects on the real economy
In this section, we aim at understanding the relationship between nancial institutions and business cycle. Studying the interconnectivity enables us to emphasize the role of the investmentnance link not just as a propagator of shocks but as the main source of nancial instability and business cycles (Minsky, 1986; Delli Gatti et al., 2011) . Moreover, thanks to the network structure we have implemented, we can explicitly analyze how systemic risk emerges from the interaction and, consequently, how small local shocks can trigger large systemic eects. Fig. 3 (top left panel) displays the average growth rate as a function of the inter-bank linkage. An increasing connectivity does not have any positive eect on the economic growth. In fact, it does not facilitate the granting of loans to enterprises , but it merely transfers liquidity among nancial institutions 23 . Instead, a higher connectivity generates a growing GDP standard deviation and , consequently, a higher macroeconomic uncertainty (see footnote 2). This result is better quantied by Fig. 3 (top right panel) , which shows the average kurtosis of growth rate over 100 simulations as a function of the connectivity. As the inter-bank linkage is raised to more than 20%, the output growth rate becomes leptokurtic and, then, shows heavy tails. A more precise measurement of fat tails is provided by the Hill exponent 24 . In gure 3 (bottom left), we plot the Hill exponent as a function of ρ. Empirically the tail exponent is found to take values between 2 and 4. When ρ < 0.5, the tail exponent approaches the "normal" value of 4. The graph shows a reduction of the volatility when the connectivity increases from 0 to 0.2. To generate fat tails in our model we need to have a probability of attachment ρ higher than 20%. The presence of 23 The granted-asked loan ratio is uncorrelated with the interbank connectivity. 24 The Hill estimator is a maximum likelihood estimator of the parameter α of the Pareto law cluster volatility is a well known phenomenon in economic literature (see Stanca and Gallegati, 1999; Cont, 2007; Tedeschi et al, 2009) , and implies that large changes in variable values occur preferably at neighboring times, reecting a tendency for markets to move from relative quiet periods to more turbulent ones. To check the volatility persistency, we measure the autocorrelation function of absolute growth rate for dierent time lags 25 . Our results show that a strongly connected inter-bank network (for ρ = 1.0) generates a positive and slowly decaying autocorrelation of absolute growth rate, which is well tted by a power law (see the bottom right panel of Fig. 3 ).
We now turn to the issue of business cycle phases. In particular, we analyze the eect of inter-bank linkages on the GDP expansion and contractions. Given that the simulated aggregated output time series show a upward trend, we extract the trend component by means of a HodrickPrescott lter (see Hodrick and Prescott 1997) . We, then, use the detrended series -usually known 25 Empirically it is observed that absolute growth rates are autocorrelated over lags of several years and decay slowly to zero. Several authors (see, for instance, Ding et al. 1983; Ding and Granger 1996; Cont et al. 1997) , have shown that the autocorrelation functions decrease hyperbolically with the time lag. Fig. 4 show that a not-too-interconnected interbank market reduces recessions and their duration 27 . The eect is reversed as the connectivity raises more than 20%, however. The turning point in the graph of Fig.4 takes place as the sharing risk associated to the decrease in the agents nancial fragility (see left panel of g.2) is more than counteracted by the increase in systemic risk associated to an extensive fraction of banks (nodes) joined together in a single giant component. In fact, when the inter-bank linkage increases more than 20%, more than half of nancial institutions are interconnected, thus forming a large giant component (see right panel of Fig.4 ). More generally, a too high connectivity of the interbank network implies a more severe trade-o between the stabilization eect of risk diversication and the higher systemic risk associated with bankruptcy cascades (see Fig.1 ) and frequent and durable recessions triggered by stronger connectivity.
We now study the distribution of the business cycle contractions 28 . Empirical ndings suggest fat tails in the distributions of macroeconomic outcomes (see Ascari et a. 2012; Di Guilmi et al. 2004 . By developing simple interactive structures among agents and feedback eects, we can reproduce the source of business uctuations: on one side, due to indirect interactions 26 The number of recessions is calculated as the number of local minima of the ltered series. The duration consists in calculating the base of the triangle which includes the points from peak-to-trough of the output ltered series (see Harding and Pagan 2002) . 27 The average number of busts (busts duration) decreases from 8. between bankrupt rms and their lending banks through the credit market and, on the other side, due to direct interactions between lender and borrower banks through the interbank system. Fig 5 (left side) reproduces the Zipf plot of the negative cumulative detrended growth rate 29 for dierent ρ. For dierent levels of connectivity, Zipf plots display a large downward concavity on the right tail. To identify the distribution generating the large curvatures on the busts tails, we test, for ρ = 1, the hypothesis that the sample over the whole time and simulations could follow a Weibull distribution 30 , as shown by empirical studies (see Di Guilmi et al. 2004 . The right side of Fig.5 shows the Weibull best t estimation, which conrms that the t is reasonable. Parameter estimations by maximum likelihood at 95% condence level return a = 0.3501 and b = 1.1645. In order to verify the robustness of this result, we have simulated the model using a Normal distribution of the relative price, u i,t ∼ N (1, σ 2 ). Also in this case the best tting distribution for contractions is Weibull with parameters a = 0.2014 and b = 1.2832. It means that the distribution of the simulated business cycle is not driven by the distribution of shocks hitting the economy. This result highlights an important feature of agent-based models, i.e. they can endogenously generate fat tails, even if they are hit by purely Gaussian uncorrelated shocks. In our case, fat tail distributed time series arise via the interactive mechanism embodied in the model, without imposing any ad hoc distribution for the exogenous shock (see Mishkin 2011; Ascari et a. 2012) . 29 In particular, we investigate the distribution of the cumulative de-trended growth rate (potential output), where cumulative refers to the sum of consecutive raw observations sharing the same sign (see Burns and Mitchell 1946; Di Guilmi et al. 2004) . We then plot the rank-ordering transformations of recessions in a log-log space (Zipf plot). 30 Weibull distribution is F (x) = 1 − exp(−ax b ).
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This work has analyzed the relationship between the organization of interaction among individuals within dierent components of the economy and overall aggregate behavior. The focus has been how economic agents interact and the possible consequences of their interaction on the economic system. By modeling a three sector economy with goods, credit and interbank market, we have been able to analyze the impact of the market connectivity on the agents performance and macro dynamics. Our results allow us to conclude that the interaction among market participants is a key element to reproduce important stylized facts about bankruptcy waves and business cycle uctuations. In particular, we have shown that a too high banks connectivity not only increases the agent's nancial fragility, but also generates larger bankruptcy cascades due to the larger systemic risk. However, we have found a non-monotonic relation between bank connectivity and micro and macro performances. Indeed, agents performance and macro activities increase with the level of the connectivity up to a threshold which can be dubbed as pseudo-optimal. On the contrary, the net eect in terms of micro and aggregate outputs is negative for any level of the connectivity exceeding the optimum threshold. Furthermore, the level of the optimal connectivity depends critically on the random network topology we have modeled. The expected structure of the random graph, in fact, varies with the value of the connectivity ρ. The links join nodes (i.e banks) together to form components, i.e., (maximal) subsets of nodes that are connected by paths through the network. Random graphs possess an important property, called phase transition (see Erdos and Renyi 1959) , from a low-density, low-ρ state in which there are few edges and all components are small, to a high-density, high-ρ state in which an extensive fraction of all banks is joined together in a single giant component. When our inter-bank market reaches the phase transition, the presence of many interconnected banks suggests that the credit network is more susceptible to the domino eect. In this case, in fact, when failures occur, many agents are potentially compromised. Our model, therefore, has shown that the linear relationship between sharing and systemic risk proposed by ceases to be valid when the agents connectivity is too high.
